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Abstract 
 
   Inspired in part by Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach to perception, current 
neurocognitive theories of action suggest that the simple viewing of an object can 
automatically elicit motor programs for specific acts. However, the degree to which such 
affordances should be considered truly automatic is unknown. Here we explored the 
generation of motor plans afforded by pairs of cue objects that were viewed peripherally 
under different attentional states. Participants focussed centrally while attending to just one of 
two peripheral cue objects that together had a strong significance for pinching, grasping, or 
both. They were instructed to ignore the objects and instead give power or precision grip 
responses to subsequent changes in background colour. The data showed a significant 
interaction between type of response and type of object, indicating that object affordances are 
perceived even in non-foveal vision. Critically, the generation of affordances was modulated 
by the locus of attention: Motor preparation was biased towards the attended object when two 
different categories of object appeared in the same trial, but the generation of affordances was 
also influenced by unattended stimuli. This finding demonstrates that object-action priming is 
not completely automatic, instead being constrained by processes of perceptual selection. 
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1. Introduction 
 
   Meaningful and efficient interactions with our environment require a strong relationship 
between visual perception and action. In view of this, Gibson (1979) proposed the concept of 
“affordances”, which can be interpreted as the actions that the environment permits for a 
particular observer (Michaels, 2003). Although the term originates in ecological psychology, 
affordances are now commonly discussed in the cognitive neuroscience literature (as here) 
without any strict adherence to Gibson’s broader theoretical position. In this literature, they 
are generally taken to be evidenced when the motor system responds to a stimulus in a highly 
automatic manner.  For example, the simple viewing of an object can automatically elicit 
motor system activity supporting possible actions towards that object, which can be either 
directly recorded, or inferred from behaviour (e.g. Chao & Martin, 2000; Craighero, Fadiga, 
Umiltà & Rizzolatti, 1996; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). This “affordance effect” arises even when 
there is no intention to implement the action. Although inferences based on behavioural 
measures have received some criticism (e.g. Anderson et al, 2002), research evidence from 
neuroimaging (e.g. Grezes et al., 2003), neuropsychology (e.g. Riddoch et al., 2003) and 
behavioural studies (e.g. Craighero et al., 1996; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Vingerhoets et al., 
2009) collectively supports the idea that stimuli with action significance provoke the 
automatic preparation of relevant actions. 
   Focussing on the behavioural work, reaction time (RT) studies have shown that responses 
to visual objects are facilitated when they overlap with the actions these objects naturally 
afford. For example, in a seminal study Tucker and Ellis (1998) tested whether the handle 
position of an object would prime right and left-hand responses during an orientation-
classification task. Responses were faster when the handle of the object and the responding 
4 
 
hand shared the same side of space, even though the position of the handle was irrelevant for 
the experimental task. In a subsequent study, Ellis and Tucker (2000) presented objects with 
action significance for pinching or grasping, while participants gave responses via a device 
that required them to mimic power and precision grips. Precision-grip responses were 
facilitated by pinchable object primes and power-grip responses were faster when viewing 
graspable objects, despite these visual objects having no relevance for the auditory 
discrimination task that was being performed. 
   In a recent study, Makris et al. (2011) further examined the potentiation of grasping 
behaviours by visual objects, while additionally exploring the temporal evolution of such 
affordances. They used object primes with action significance for pinching or grasping, as 
well as neutral objects. Two different methodologies were applied, one based on RTs and the 
other on corticospinal excitability (assessed by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) and measuring motor evoked potentials (MEPs)). The first experimental task involved 
participants viewing the stimuli briefly, then responding to background colour changes with 
pinching and grasping actions (similar to Ellis and Tucker, 2000). During the second 
experiment, participants viewed the same objects passively while receiving single-pulse TMS 
over their primary motor cortex. MEPs were recorded from two intrinsic hand muscles 
associated with a power or precision grip. In both experiments, three different stimulus-onset 
asynchronies (SOAs) were used to provide a time course for the development of affordances. 
Both RT and MEP measures implied that the generation of a congruent motor plan had 
occurred in the period immediately after object presentation (already evident at 300-400ms) 
which then rapidly decayed (by ~600 ms post stimulus). 
   The rapid decay of affordances identified by Makris et al. (2011) is intriguing, and could 
reflect the metabolic or computational costs associated with maintaining plans for action. 
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However, other potential explanations emerge from the specific experimental conditions 
used. In particular, the role of visuospatial attention must be considered. Newly appearing 
objects are known to automatically and exogenously grab attention (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). 
Furthermore, exogenous attentional cuing generates both benefits and costs across time, with 
such “inhibition of return” (Posner & Cohen, 1984) implying the withdrawal of attention to 
facilitate subsequent visual search. This pattern is of obvious relevance to the activation and 
dissipation of affordances observed by Makris et al. (2011). 
   The role of attention in affordances is explicitly acknowledged within at least one recent 
model (the affordance competition model; Cisek, 2006). Indeed, while the affordance concept 
might be taken to imply the simultaneous generation of an overwhelming multitude of motor 
plans, mechanisms of selective attention could prevent such overload. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, the interplay of attention with the generation of affordances has 
received little attention to date (but see Ellis et. al, 2007; Murphy, van Velzen & de Fockert, 
2012). Work linking attention with affordances has been carried out, but it has tended to 
focus on either the way objects and affordances might drive the allocation of attention (e.g. 
Roberts & Humphreys, 2011b) or, somewhat relatedly, the role of attention as a possible 
confound in experiments investigating affordances via stimuli with lateralised handles (e.g. 
Anderson et al., 2002; Cho & Proctor, 2010; Riggio et al. 2008). Here, we instead consider 
the extent to which affordances develop for objects appearing inside and outside the locus of 
covert visuospatial attention. 
   To this end, we used the experimental designs of Ellis and Tucker (2000) and Makris et al. 
(2011) in which participants were required to give power or precision grip responses to an 
arbitrary stimulus presented alongside object primes. Whereas most previous studies have 
investigated the affordance effect for centrally located stimuli, we instead applied a covert 
6 
 
attention paradigm with pictures of objects viewed peripherally. More specifically, we 
presented pictures of pinchable and graspable objects in both hemifields while participants 
focussed on a central fixation cross. Subjects attended to either the left or right side and 
responded to colour change occurrences. Hence we applied a classic endogenous attention 
paradigm (c.f. Posner, 1980, but here based on a 100% valid cue). We expected the pragmatic 
properties of visual objects to activate specific motor plans, evidenced as a response/object 
congruency advantage. The methodology applied allowed us to additionally demonstrate that 
affordances are modulated by the allocation of attention. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
   The study was approved by the City University London Psychology Department Ethical 
Committee in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki (1964). 
We tested 20 naïve participants (11 females; Mean age = 24, SD = 5.2), all assessed by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and all right-handed (Mean Lateralization 
index (LI) = 0.93, SD = 0.18). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
 
2.2. Material/Apparatus 
   The stimulus set consisted of 10 objects; 5 associated with a power grip and 5 associated 
with a precision grip (Appendix A). Coloured pictures of all objects were taken and presented 
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in approximately their natural size (9.6º to 11.3º visual angles for “pinchable” objects and 
14.8º to 15.2º for “graspable” objects) within a background rectangle (typically larger than 
the object being presented by ~ 6º). All pictures of objects were presented peripherally (with 
the middle of the objects always at 14.2º temporally) on a 19-inch LCD screen (refresh rate 
60 Hz). Objects appeared with no obvious intrinsic left/right orientation (i.e. oriented with 
their handle, if present, positioned near the vertical). Pictures of these pinch-grip and power-
grip objects on a white background served as primes and pictures of the same objects on a 
subtle yellow or blue background were the targets (i.e. participants responded to a change of 
colour). The response device was adapted from Ellis and Tucker (2000). It consisted of a 
plastic cylinder, at the top of which a small pressure button was attached, and a small plastic 
pressure switch that was taped to the inside tip of the participant’s thumb. Participants held 
the device with their dominant hand, pinching the switch with their index finger and thumb, 
and grasping the cylinder with the remaining three fingers against the palm. In this way, 
responses with the cylinder or the switch mimicked power or precision grips respectively. 
 
2.3. Eye tracker  
   We were interested in the allocation of covert spatial attention towards objects viewed 
peripherally. Hence, a chinrest-mounted video eye-tracker was employed to ensure 
participants maintained central fixation (Model C6, Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, 
MA; sampling rate = 125Hz, calibrated manually using a nine-point fixation stimulus).  
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2.4. Design & Procedure 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE> 
 
   The experiment was controlled by a PC running E-Prime Software version 1.1 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, 2002). A second PC running Eye-Trac 6 .Net User 
Interface (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA) recorded eye-tracker measurements. 
Participants were seated comfortably at a distance of 50 cm from the computer screen 
(maintained with a chin rest). After briefly demonstrating how to hold and use the response 
device, a short practice session commenced (approximately 30 trials). 
   In the experiment, participants were asked to fixate a centrally located cross, while 
attending to either the left or right side of the screen for the response targets (blocked, with 
order counterbalanced across participants). Each trial started with the fixation cross on screen 
for one second, after which two prime (object) stimuli appeared on a white background to the 
left and right. There were four different conditions: Pinchable objects at both the left and 
right side (“same pinchable” condition); graspable objects at both the left and right side 
(“same graspable”); pinchable object at the left side and graspable object at the right side 
(“mixed PG”), and vice versa (“mixed GP”).  The SOA between the prime objects and the 
response target was 500 ms. The response target was a subtle change in one of the primes’ 
background colour (to either blue or yellow), always on the attended side. Half of the 
participants pressed the cylinder for a blue colour change and the small switch for a yellow 
target, with mapping swapped for the other half. The target remained visible until the 
participant gave a response, at which point the next trial commenced. Overall there were 400 
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trials (2 blocks, attending to left/right sides, x 4 conditions x 2 targets x 25 combinations of 
the five possible objects on the left and the five possible objects on the right). Each 
participant received a different random ordering. After the end of the experiment all 
participants were debriefed and compensated. 
 
2.5. Data analysis 
   All data were processed offline using Eye-Trac 6 .Net User Interface (Applied Science 
Laboratories, Bedford, MA), E-Data Aid Software version 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A., 2002) and Microsoft Excel (2007 edition). The eye-tracker 
software recorded X-Y gaze co-ordinates. We inspected these for a time period of one second 
post stimulus presentation (by synching the clocks of both computers using a common 
internet source at the start of each session). Trials containing saccades (an eye movement 
with ≥3.4º excursion from the fixation point) were removed from the analysis. The trial 
removal rate for all participants was less than 10%. Response errors were logged when the 
response (power or precision grip) was incorrect based on the background colour change. All 
participants showed an error rate of less than 10%. The median of reaction times (RTs) was 
calculated using only correct trials for each participant in each condition. These data were 
then submitted to a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with attention side 
(left, right), type of response (power grip, precision grip), object-type presentation condition 
(same, mixed) and response congruence to the type of the attended object (congruent, 
incongruent; i.e. a power-grip response to an attended graspable object was considered as 
congruent) as within-subjects factors. An identical analysis was performed on mean error 
rates across the different experimental conditions, but showed no significant main effects or 
interactions, and no trend indicative of a speed-accuracy trade off, so is not reported here. 
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3. Results 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE> 
 
   In experiments of this kind, affordance effects are usually reported as an interaction 
between the type of response that is being made and the type of object that is being displayed. 
To simplify our presentation, here we instead selected an alternative coding of the conditions 
(as specified in the data analysis, above) in order to generate a single experimental factor 
representing the match between the object presented at the attended location and the response 
that was made.1 Thus we assessed congruence as a main effect, and investigated how it 
interacted with our other experimental manipulations. Because attention-side and response-
type did not yield main effects or interactions in our analysis we collapsed these factors to 
further simplify the presentation of the results.  
   Our ANOVA showed that the interaction between object presentation condition and 
congruence (with congruency representing a match between the response and the object at the 
attended location) was significant [F (19, 1) = 7.54; p = 0.013; η² = 0.28].  Also, there was a 
significant main effect of congruence [F (19, 1) = 52.06; p < 0.001; η² = 0.73]. Given the 
significant two-way interaction and the fact that there were no other significant main effects 
or interactions, we decided to collapse our data for the attention-side and response-type 
factors (see Figure 2). Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed that congruent responses (M = 460, SD 
= 73) were significantly faster than incongruent responses (M = 512, SD = 83) for the same-
                                                          
1
 Note that the particular choice of factorial coding does not influence effect sizes in any way; it simply allows 
us to convert what would, under a more traditional coding, be a four-way statistical interaction, into a main 
effect (which is much easier to graph, and also easier to understand in interaction with other factors). 
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object presentation condition [t (19) = 7.5; p < 0.001]. Also, congruent responses (M = 491, 
SD = 81) were significantly faster than incongruent responses (M = 505, SD = 88) for the 
mixed-object presentation condition [t (19) = 2.89; p = 0.009]. Finally, congruent responses 
for the same-object presentation condition (M = 461, SD = 73) were significantly faster than 
congruent responses for the mixed-object presentation condition (M = 491, SD = 81) [t (19) = 
2.18; p = 0.042], but there was a non-significant trend in the opposite direction for 
incongruent responses, driving the interaction in the ANOVA. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
    
   Our experiment revealed that responses were quicker when the object at the attended 
location matched the response that was being made, be it a precision or power grip. Most 
importantly, even for the mixed-object presentation conditions, in which objects of both types 
were presented, responses congruent to the object at the attended location were facilitated. 
However, in this case the affordance effect was not as strong as for the same-object 
presentation conditions, and thus we can infer that unattended objects also affected the 
responses: Attentional selection drove the generation of affordances, but unattended objects 
still exerted some influence on the motor system. 
   To expand on this interpretation: The data analysis illustrates that congruent responses were 
faster than incongruent responses for conditions of both same-object and mixed-object 
presentation, but that this effect appears magnified for same-object conditions. To understand 
this result, consider what was occurring in each condition. In same-object conditions, the 
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attended object was accompanied by an identical object opposite the locus of attention. 
Hence, in the absence of attention, we might think of the comparison as being between 
double congruent and double incongruent object presentations. The RT difference thus 
demonstrates how affordances were generated despite the fact that objects appeared in the 
periphery. In mixed-object conditions, by contrast, one object of each type was being 
presented, implying that in the absence of attention both responses would be equally primed, 
so no differential affordance effect would emerge. The fact that an effect does emerge 
suggests that the object at the attended location received higher weight in the generation of 
affordances, demonstrating attentional modulation. However, the fact that the congruence 
effect appears smaller here relative to the same-object conditions implies that the object at the 
unattended location must also have been having some effect, either boosting the generation of 
the affordance in the same-object condition, counteracting it in the mixed-object condition, or 
both. Note that our data do not indicate whether the influence of this unattended object was 
discrete (i.e. it resulted from this object having captured attention on a subset of trials despite 
the overall task set) or was more uniform in nature (i.e. some influence of the unattended 
stimulus was reaching the motor system on all trials).   
   These results are in broad accordance with findings from previous studies concerning the 
generation of affordances via object priming (Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Makris et al, 2011; 
Tucker & Ellis, 2001). More specifically, Ellis and Tucker (2000) found that participants’ 
power and precision grip responses to an irrelevant auditory stimulus were faster when 
viewing objects with significance for congruent actions. These results were further confirmed 
in our previous study (Makris et al, 2011), which demonstrated how visual objects potentiate 
congruent motor programs even in cases where there is no intention to execute the motor 
command.  
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   The importance of the present results lies in the methodology applied for examining the 
generation of affordances by viewing objects with action significance under different states of 
attention. Unlike many previous studies (i.e. Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Makris et al, 2011; Tucker 
& Ellis, 1998, 2001) that used centrally located stimuli as primes, we had the participants 
viewing and responding to objects perceived using a covert form of visual attention. This 
means that objects presented away from the fovea and thus processed with lower resolution 
with regards to their physical characteristics were still able to excite the motor system into 
producing programs for relevant actions.  
   A previous study by Ellis et al (2007) applied a somewhat similar methodology in order to 
investigate the involvement of action codes in object-level selection. More specifically, they 
tested how in multiple-object displays the presence of distractors facilitated or inhibited 
responses to relevant targets (see also Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002). In four different 
experiments they presented at the same time pinchable and graspable objects and they asked 
participants to respond to a simple geometric property via a device that permitted the 
measurement of power and precision grips. Target and distractor objects were displayed 
either close to each other or at distant spatial locations. Participants were instructed to 
identify the target either by a colour feature or by a specific spatial location. The results 
showed that the presence of object-distractors impaired compatible responses whenever 
participants had the chance to attend and overtly perceive their physical properties (i.e. when 
the target was indicated by the colour, requiring an initial selection process on every trial). 
However, this inhibition effect was not obtained when participants did not have to consider 
the distractor in order to identify the target (i.e. when the target was always presented at the 
same location). In the present study it was found that positive affordance effects could be 
generated in cases of mixed-object presentations, with unattended stimuli affecting responses. 
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Hence, contrary to the observation of Ellis et al (2007), in our study unattended stimuli 
induced compatible motor response codes. It may be that their interference effect was specific 
to conditions in which the distractor must be processed and then de-selected.  
   There are also some other important methodological differences between the present study 
and the one described by Ellis and his colleagues. In 3 of their 4 experiments participants 
viewed both the target and the distractor overtly (i.e. by fixating them) whereas in our study 
stimuli were always perceived covertly. Furthermore, in the experiment for which they 
reported no evidence of an inhibition effect, the target was always perceived overtly and the 
distractor was peripherally displayed, thus visual acuity was not equally dispersed between 
the stimuli. The present study managed to obtain effects from unattended objects, but in this 
case both attended and unattended stimuli were perceived covertly. Overall, we would 
suggest (with due diffidence) that the methodology described here had a better control over 
the attentional conditions under which affordance effects were generated, and hence we 
managed to present evidence of affordances extracted from unattended objects. 
   We are aware of only one other study that has directly addressed how attention to object 
primes can affect the degree to which those objects generate affordances whilst controlling 
overt attention. Murphy, van Velzen and de Fockert (2012) chose a quite different approach 
for modulating attention to that used here. They varied the degree of “perceptual load” (see 
Lavie, 2005, for review) for a letter identification task performed at fixation. At the same 
time, they assessed congruency effects from peripheral prime objects with left/right oriented 
handles on a left/right hand button-press response. Consistent with the results we have 
presented, they found a congruency effect of peripheral objects on responses, but only when 
central perceptual load was low, permitting attention to spill into the periphery. Our results 
complement theirs nicely; whereas they tested situations varying from almost zero attention 
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(high central load, object not at the locus of attention) to limited attention (low central load, 
object not at the locus of attention), we have shown continued attentional modulation as we 
move from limited attention (object not at the locus of attention) to full attention (object at 
the locus of attention).  
   Like the study of Murphy, van Velzen and de Fockert  (2012), our study suggests that 
objects potentiate associated action plans, but to a degree that depends upon how much 
attention they are receiving. Such a process could be considered as improvident, since in 
general we are surrounded by a multitude of objects that draw our attention directly or 
indirectly. This should result in the formation of many motor plans for actions that will never 
be implemented. One possible theoretical reason to explain such a “waste” of resources is 
that this generation of motor programs to deal with a multitude of contingencies can result in 
a crucial speed advantage for relevant actions (Yarrow et al, 2009). Moreover, Cisek (2006, 
2007) has incorporated this notion into a theory of motor decision making known as the 
“affordance competition” hypothesis. According to this theory, attended visual stimuli 
automatically elicit the generation of motor plans across visuo-motor regions. In order for a 
single motor plan to then “win” and be expressed as action, a neural mechanism of mutual 
inhibitory connections and biasing inputs from decision centres takes over to drive selection. 
Theories like this are a fundamental departure from more serial architectures in which 
attention gates perceptual information to inform decision making, which occurs prior to the 
generation of plans for action. Our results provide concrete support for the inclusion of 
attentional selection in the affordance competition model. 
   In conclusion, this study provided evidence for the existence of an affordance effect and 
suggested that affordances still develop even in cases of covert attention, with attention 
partially modulating their generation. Our results suggest that object affordances are 
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automatically perceived even in non-foveal vision, but to a greater extent under 
circumstances that allow an adequate processing of their physical characteristics, such as 
when covert attention is directed towards an object. This finding places important constraints 
on the degree to which affordances can be considered fully automatic, and thus impervious to 
the operation of other psychological processes.     
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Appendix A 
 
List of the objects used to form the stimuli set. 
 
Graspable objects                   Pinchable objects 
 
Crystal glass 
Hammer 
Wooden brush 
Thermos mug 
Spanner 
 
 
Grape 
Screw 
Plug 
Key 
Pencil sharpener 
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Legend to Figure 1. 
Sequence of presentation in a typical trial (here, a mixed PG trial in the attended left block).
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Legend to Figure 2. 
Means of median response times, with conditions collapsed as determined by the overall 
ANOVA (see main text) to reveal the critical interaction between congruency and 
presentation condition. Error bars denote standard errors.  
 
 
